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Theorists within the egalitarian liberal tradition have grappled with the question of how to
achieve an alignment between the attribution of equal worth and citizenship to each person
and the distribution of material resources in democratic societies. Their insights are relevant
to devising constitutionally grounded strategies for redressing the intertwined challenges of
poverty and inequality in post-apartheid South Africa. This article examines the
implications of these theories for integrating the value of equality in the interpretation of
socio-economic rights by the courts. It concludes that Nancy Fraser’s principle of parity of
participation offers rich possibilities for rendering both reasonableness review and the
application of socio-economic rights to contractual relations more responsive to systemic
social and economic inequalities.
I INTRODUCTION
Just over twenty years have elapsed since the transition to democracy in
South Africa, yet poverty and inequality remain deeply inscribed in our
post-apartheid landscape. The proportion of people living below a rough
poverty line of US$2 per day or R525 a month per person hovers around 50
per cent.1 Moreover, South Africa is also a country scarred by deep
inequalities based on race, gender, disability, class and other grounds. A stark
indicator of class-based inequality is the steep gap in income distribution.
According to the Gini coefﬁcient, which measures the gap between the
richest and poorest, South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the
* I am indebted to David Bilchitz and Daryl Glaser for inviting me to present an
earlier version of this paper at a conference held on 3 October 2013 entitled
‘Egalitarian liberalism: What are its possible futures in South Africa?’ I am grateful for
helpful comments received from the participants at this conference, as well as two
anonymous referees. The support of the National Research Foundation (NRF) is
acknowledged. Any opinion, ﬁnding, conclusion or recommendation expressed in
this article is that of the author and the NRF does not accept any liability in regard
thereto.
† BALLB (UCT) LLM (Essex) LLD (Wits).
1 National Planning Commission Diagnostic Overview, ‘Human Conditions
Diagnostic’ The Presidency, RSA at 2, available at http://www.npconline.co.za/
MediaLib/Downloads/Home/Tabs/Diagnostic/Diagnostic_Human_conditions.pdf, accessed
on 11 March 2014 (hereafter ‘NPC Diagnostic Overview’). The ﬁgure of R525 a
month per person is based on 2008 prices, updated to 2010.
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world.2 Despite rising per capita income since 1994, approximately 50 per
cent of national income continues to go to the richest 10 per cent of
households, while the poorest 40 per cent of households receive just over
5 per cent of income.3 Whilst there has been a decline in racial disparities in
the top 20 per cent of income earners, the average income gaps between
racial groups remain high and there is growing inequality within the African
population.4 Jeremy Seekings & Nicoli Nattrass argue that extreme inequal-
ity has persisted since 1994 primarily because ‘the distributional regime of the
late apartheid period has been reformed (primarily through deracialisation)
rather than transformed or rejected in favour of a more egalitarian one’.5 A
lived sense of unfairness at gross socio-economic inequalities of South
African society is at least a partial explanation for the wave of service delivery
protests throughout the country.6
The National Development Plan (‘NDP’) adopted by the National
Planning Commission incorporates a range of strategic policy objectives for
redressing the twin scourges of poverty and inequality.7 Poverty and
inequality are thus central political and policy objectives in South Africa.
However, what is less clear from the NDP is the nature of the relationship
between poverty and inequality. Moreover, the NDP pays scant attention to
the implications of the legal norms and framework contained in the 1996
Constitution for responding to these challenges. This is surprising given the
prominent place in the Constitution of a set of fundamental rights and values
of direct relevance to the objectives of poverty reduction and the achieve-
ment of a more egalitarian society. The inclusion of equality as a fundamental
right8 and foundational value in the Constitution9 together with a range of
2 The NPC Diagnostic Overview ibid at 3 records South Africa’s Gini-co-
efﬁcient to be 0.67 (where 0 indicates no inequality and 1 complete inequality). See
also 29.
3 ‘Development Indicators’ (2012), Minister in the Presidency for Performance,
Monitoring and Evaluation as well as Administration at 26, available at http://
www.thepresidency.gov.za/MediaLib/Downloads/Home/Publications/DPMEIndicators
2013/DPME%20Indicators%202013.pdf, accessed on 16 July 2014.
4 The NPC Diagnostic Overview op cit note 1 at 3–4; Development Indicators
2012 ibid at 26–7, citing a study by M Leibbrandt, I Woolard, A Finn & J Argent
Trends in South African Income Distribution and Poverty Since the Fall of Apartheid (2010).
5 Jeremy Seekings & Nicoli Nattrass Class, Race and Inequality in South Africa
(2006) 6.
6 See Karl von Holdt ‘Insurgent citizenship and collective violence: Analysis of
case studies’ in Karl von Holdt, Malose Langa, Sepetla Molapo, Nomfundo Mogapi,
Kindiza Ngubeni, Jacob Dlamini & Adele Kirsten The Smoke that Calls: Insurgent
Citizenship, Collective Violence and the Struggle for a Place in the New South Africa: Eight
Case Studies of Community Protest and Xenophobic Violence (2011) 24.
7 National Planning Commission National Development Plan: Vision for 2030
(2011), available at http://www.npconline.co.za/medialib/downloads/home/NPC%20
National%20Development%20Plan%20Vision%202030%20-lo-res.pdf, accessed on
11March 2014.
8 Section 9.
9 Sections 1(a) and 7(1).
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justiciable socio-economic rights invites consideration of how the interpre-
tation of these norms can support and guide the political project of achieving
a more egalitarian distribution of resources in South Africa.
This article seeks to contribute to this project through focusing on the
relevance of equality as a value in the interpretation of the socio-economic
rights provisions of the Bill of Rights with reference to the insights that can
be gained from major political and legal philosophers working within the
broad egalitarian liberal tradition.
The ﬁrst part of the article focuses on the question why equality is relevant
to the question of interpreting socio-economic rights by considering the
nature of the interrelationship between inequality and poverty. The second
part assesses the arguments of leading egalitarian liberal theorists — Ronald
Dworkin, Amartya Sen and John Rawls — on the questions of the
appropriate metric of equality (what must be equalised), and the nature and
degree of equalisation that meet the requirements of justice (how must
equalisation occur). I conclude this part by examining the principle of parity
of participation developed by the critical theorist Nancy Fraser, and argue
that it provides an optimal frame for integrating the values of equality in our
socio-economic rights jurisprudence. The ﬁnal part of the article illustrates
how parity of participation can be applied in practice in two major areas of
socio-economic rights jurisprudence.
II THE RELEVANCE OF EQUALITY TO SOCIO-ECONOMIC
RIGHTS
Sections 26(1) and 27(1) of the Constitution entrench the right of people to
have access to a certain substantive standard of socio-economic rights —
‘adequate’ housing, ‘sufﬁcient’ food and water, and ‘appropriate’ social
security. Achievement of this standard is qualiﬁed by reference to the three
concepts of ‘progressive realisation’, ‘within available resources’ and ‘reason-
able legislative and other measures’ encountered in ss 26(2) and (3). In
assessing the constitutionality of the state’s positive duties in terms of ss 26
and 27, the Constitutional Court has adopted a model of reasonableness
review which is designed to assist the courts in negotiating the challenges of
institutional legitimacy and competency in enforcing socio-economic
rights.10 Reasonableness review thus aims at encouraging the legislature and
executive to select and adopt legislation, policies and programmes to give
effect to the relevant rights, allowing the state an ample sphere of policy
choice and ﬂexibility.11 At the same time, the court has carved out a distinct,
10 For an analysis of this jurisprudence, see Sandra Liebenberg Socio-Economic
Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) ch 4; Stuart Wilson &
Jackie Dugard ‘Constitutional jurisprudence: The ﬁrst and second waves’ in M Lang-
ford, B Cousins, J Dugard & T Madlingozi (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa:
Symbols or Substance? (2014) 35.
11 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para
41 (hereafter ‘Grootboom’). See generally on weak forms of judicial review in the
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but limited, role for itself by identifying certain factors that are indicative of
unreasonable state conduct or omissions. Key factors in this regard are: a
failure by government to take steps to realise the rights; a lack of provision
within a government programme for those most desperately in need; a lack
of ﬂexibility and responsiveness to relevant scientiﬁc and social impact
evidence; the absence of meaningful engagement with the beneﬁciaries of
the rights; or the adoption of a policy with unreasonable limitations or
exclusions.12
The last-mentioned factor bears the most obvious overlap with the right
and value of equality in that it designates under-inclusive social policies as
suspect. In the Mazibuko case,13 the Constitutional Court characterised its
prior decision in the Treatment Action Campaign case as an example of policy
containing unreasonable exclusions. The Nevirapine programme to reduce
mother-to-child transmission of HIV was restricted to two pilot sites per
province, excluding the remaining 90 per cent of women who gave birth in
the public health sector.14 According to the court, all it did in Treatment
Action Campaign was ‘to render the existing government policy available to
all’.15
The relationship between this factor in the reasonableness inquiry and
equality is also evident where government policy unfairly excludes a
particular group from accessing a socio-economic right on a prohibited
ground of discrimination. The primary example of the latter is the Khosa
case, which found the eligibility criteria in the Social Assistance Act 59 of
1992 unconstitutional on the basis that it unfairly and unreasonably restricted
access to social grants to citizens thereby excluding permanent residents. The
fact that the legislative distinction in the delivery of social grants reinforced
broader social patterns of privilege and marginalisation against non-citizens
was a signiﬁcant factor in concluding that the distinction was both unfair in
terms of s 9(3), and unreasonable in terms of s 27. In her judgment, Mokgoro
J alludes to the responsibility of the political community to ensure that
decisions concerning the distribution of social and economic resources
reﬂect the equal citizenship of its poorest members:
context of social rights, Mark Tushnet Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and
Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (2008); Rosalind Dixon ‘Creat-
ing dialogue about socio-economic rights: Strong-form versus weak-form judicial
review revisited’ (2007) 5 International J of Constitutional Law 391.
12 This represents a synthesis of the factors developed in Grootboom ibid; Minister of
Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (hereafter ‘Treatment Action
Campaign’); Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlauli v Minister of Social Develop-
ment 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) (hereafter ‘Khosa’); Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of
Johannesburg 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) (hereafter ‘Olivia Road’); Residents of Joe Slovo
Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC) (hereafter ‘Joe
Slovo’); Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) (hereafter ‘Mazibuko
(CC)’).
13 Mazibuko (CC) ibid para 67.
14 Treatment Action Campaign supra note 12 para 62.
15 Mazibuko (CC) supra note 12 para 64.
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‘Sharing responsibility for the problems and consequences of poverty equally as
a community represents the extent to which wealthier members of the
community view the minimal well-being of the poor as connected with their
personal well-being and the well-being of the community as a whole. In other
words, decisions about the allocation of public beneﬁts represent the extent to
which poor people are treated as equal members of society.’16
However, the equality-based reasoning in both Treatment Action Campaign
and Khosa is based on the exclusion of certain groups from social pro-
grammes. It does not relate to the content (quantity and quality) of the social
goods and services that must be provided — albeit progressively over time
and within the state’s available resources. This lack of attribution by the
Constitutional Court of normative content to the socio-economic rights in
ss 26 and 27 has been a major source of academic criticism.17 The two main
substantive elements in the reasonableness inquiry are the threshold require-
ment that a reasonable government programme must provide some form of
short-term relief for those in desperate need or living in intolerable
conditions,18 and the requirement discussed above that the policy be
inclusive and comprehensive. The remaining criteria speak to the process and
manner in which the state goes about adopting and implementing a
programme to give effect to socio-economic rights.19 The question which
arises then is how can the value of equality help inform not only who is
included within the scope of a reasonable government programme but also
the nature and quality of goods and services that must be secured.
By focusing on the value of equality, I do not suggest that other values and
human interests such as survival,20 human dignity,21 and autonomy22 are not
16 Ibid para 74.
17 See Danie Brand ‘The proceduralisation of South African socio-economic
rights jurisprudence or ‘‘What are socio-economic rights for?’’ ’ in H Botha, A J van
der Walt & J van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution
(2003) 33; David Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforce-
ment of Socio-Economic Rights (2007) ch 5; Marius Pieterse ‘Eating socioeconomic
rights: The usefulness of rights talk in alleviating social hardship revisited’ (2007) 29
Human Rights Quarterly 796. Liebenberg op cit note 10 at ch 4.
18 Grootboom supra note 11 paras 44, 95 and 99.
19 Brand op cit note 17 at 43–51 describes the criteria of reasonableness review as
structural good governance as opposed to substantive needs-based standards.
20 For example, David Bilchitz has argued for the recognition of a minimum core
obligation in respect of socio-economic rights on the basis of the urgent interest
which people have in being free from general threats to their survival ‘as the inability
to survive wipes out all possibility for realising the sources of value in the life of a
being.’Bilchitz op cit note 17 at 187.
21 For example, Sandra Liebenberg ‘The value of human dignity in interpreting
socio-economic rights’ (2005) 21 SAJHR 1.
22 Bilchitz justiﬁes a second threshold of interests (beyond the ﬁrst minimum core
threshold) protected by socio-economic rights as the general conditions that are
necessary to enable the fulﬁlment of a wide range of purposes. Bilchitz op cit note 17
at 188. In this sense socio-economic rights help secure individual autonomy and
agency tomeaningfully choose and pursue various life paths.
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relevant to this question. Rather, I argue that equality as a value should also
constitute a signiﬁcant part of our understanding of the purposes and values
of socio-economic rights. However, this relationship between socio-
economic rights and equality is less obvious and more controversial. There
have been a number of attempts to explicate the relationship between
equality and socio-economic rights,23 but signiﬁcant scholarship also exists
arguing that the interpretation of socio-economic rights should be developed
independently of the value of equality.
For example, in the context of United States constitutional jurisprudence,
Frank Michelman has argued forcefully that welfare rights (in his terminol-
ogy) are better understood as providing protection against egregious forms of
deprivation rather than relative inequalities in the level of social goods and
services enjoyed by different sections of society.24 The remedy for depriva-
tion is adequate provision, whereas the remedy for discrimination in social
provisioning is equalisation. He argued that courts are institutionally better
suited to protect against a deprivation of basic needs than to engage in an
ill-fated effort to compensate for pervasive market-based inequalities in social
provisioning.25 However, Michelman’s argument should be understood in its
context as an exposition of the strategic possibilities of the judicial recogni-
tion of welfare rights given the lack of explicit constitutional recognition of
such rights in the United States Federal Constitution. He argued that the
non-discrimination lens of the Fourteenth Amendment was not the optimal
route to achieving the judicial protection of welfare-related interests. He did
not dispute the broader proposition that poverty and inequality are inter-
related, nor did he argue that equality was irrelevant in developing the
content of socio-economic rights.
In the context of South Africa, the text and ethos of the Constitution
strongly suggests a mutually constitutive relationship26 between equality and
socio-economic rights.27 Equality is not only a foundational value to be
23 See Pierre de Vos ‘Grootboom, the right of access to adequate housing and sub-
stantive equality as contextual fairness’ (2001) 17 SAJHR 258; Sandra Liebenberg &
Beth Goldblatt ‘The interrelationship between equality and socio-economic rights
under SouthAfrica’s transformative constitution (2007) 23 SAJHR 335; Sandra Fred-
man ‘The potential and limits of an equal rights paradigm in addressing poverty’
(2011) 22 Stellenbosch LR 566. For a set of essays examining various socio-economic
rights from a gender equality perspective, see Beth Goldblatt & Kirsty McLean (eds)
Women’s Social and Economic Rights: Developments in South Africa (2011).
24 Frank Michelman ‘The Supreme Court, 1968 term – Foreword: On protecting
the poor through the FourteenthAmendment’ (1969) 83 Harvard LR 7.
25 He argued that the US Supreme Court should be seen, ‘not as nine (or seven or
ﬁve) Canutes railing against tides of economic inequality which they have no appar-
ent means of stemming, but as a body commendably busy with the critically impor-
tant task of charting some islands of haven from economic disaster in the ocean of . . .
free enterprise.’ Ibid at 33.
26 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this terminology.
27 Section 1(a) of the Constitution refers to ‘human dignity, the achievement of
equality, and the advancement of human rights and freedoms’ as amongst South
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promoted, along with human dignity and freedom, in the interpretation of
all rights in the Bill of Rights;28 it is also a fundamental right expressly deﬁned
to include ‘the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms’.29
Moreover, the fact that the reasonableness model of review is essentially a
ﬂexible multi-factor standard for assessing socio-economic rights compliance
makes it well-suited to considering and weighing a range of fundamental
human interests and values — including relevant dimensions of equality —
that may be implicated by different kinds of socio-economic rights viola-
tions.30
Before turning to examine what light egalitarian liberal theorists can shed
on the question of how equality can be incorporated in the interpretation of
socio-economic rights, I consider recent empirical evidence demonstrating
how equality and poverty are intertwined in contemporary democracies.
First, empirical evidence demonstrates that socio-economic inequalities
continue to generate continuous cycles of poverty and social exclusion. In
other words, inequality can undermine well-intentioned policies designed to
realise socio-economic rights. Richard Wilkinson & Kate Pickett have
demonstrated that countries with the highest levels of inequality fare worst in
terms of almost every quality of life indicator from life expectancy, crime
levels, literacy to health.31 They demonstrate how steep income differentials
and relatively rigid class stratiﬁcations contribute to the intergenerational
transmission of poverty and a lack of social mobility in almost every sphere
relevant to socio-economic rights. Their research illustrates how poverty is
not a static condition of deprivation of needs, but a product of relationships
of political, economic, social and even personal power. Steep disparities of
wealth enable people to accumulate greater economic power, which in turn
enables them to exclude others from accessing the goods and services which
are subject to the market’s mechanisms of exchange.32 As Amartya Sen has
Africa’s foundational constitutional values. International human rights law also
afﬁrms a close association between equality, non-discrimination and socio-economic
rights. According to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
non-discrimination and equality ‘are . . . essential to the exercise and enjoyment of
economic, social and cultural rights.’General Comment No 20 (Non-discrimination in
economic, social and cultural rights (art 2 (2)) UN doc E/C.12/GC/20 para 2.
28 Section 39(2).
29 Section 9(2). This provision proceeds to mandate afﬁrmation action measures
‘to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair
discrimination’. On the substantive nature of the equality guarantee, see Minister of
Finance v Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA121 (CC) para 27; CatherineAlbertyn ‘Substantive
equality and transformation in SouthAfrica’ (2007) 23 SAJHR 253.
30 The Constitutional Court has observed that the realisation of socio-economic
rights ‘is also key to the advancement of race and gender equality and the evolution of
a society in which men and women are equally able to achieve their full potential’.
Grootboom supra note 11 para 23.
31 Richard Wilkinson & Kate Pickett The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for
Everyone (2010).
32 On the distorting impact of inequality on the functioning of markets, see Joseph
E Stiglitz The Price of Inequality (2012) 52–82.
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also pointed out in the context of his capabilities theory,33 relative income
deprivations can yield absolute capability deprivation:
‘Being relatively poor in a rich country can be a great capability handicap even
when one’s absolute income is high in terms of world standards. In a generally
opulent country, more income is needed to buy enough commodities to
achieve the same social functioning.’34
In other words, inequality has a disparate impact on people’s ability to
convert resources such as income into valued personal functionings and
social circumstances.35
Secondly, income and resource disparities result in the unequal enjoy-
ment, not only of socio-economic rights, but also civil and political rights.36
Both sets of rights play a crucial role in enabling people to access and exert
inﬂuence in the various forums where distributive decisions are made
affecting socio-economic rights. The wealthy have superior opportunities to
access quality education, political decision-making processes, the media and
legal representation — all crucial mechanisms for protecting and advancing
people’s material interests in a democracy. This can result in vicious spiral of
inequality as disparities in political power perpetuate unequal access to
socio-economic rights which in turn deepen political inequalities.37 Creating
accessible channels for public participation in policy and law-making
processes can mitigate the political marginalisation of the poor by requiring
those in power to hear their voices.38 However, providing opportunities for
public participation in both law-making and rights-enforcement processes
cannot on its own overcome the systemic disadvantages of poverty and
inequality. Resource disparities will continue to have a signiﬁcant impact on
people’s ability to access and enjoy equal voice in such participatory
processes. Paying attention to resource inequalities is thus essential to giving
33 See further, part III(b) below.
34 Amartya Sen The Idea of Justice (2010) 256. For a more detailed argument, see
Amartya Sen ‘Poor, relatively speaking’35 Oxford Economic Papers (1983) 153–69.
35 See Sen’s discussion of other contingencies that can affect people’s ability to
convert income into sources of value in their lives. Sen (2010) ibid at 255–7.
36 As John Rawls has pointed out, when economic and social inequalities are large,
they tend to support political inequality and domination of one group by another:
JohnRawls Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001) 130–1.
37 For comparative accounts of the inﬂuence of poverty and inequality on political
participation, see Martha Jackman ‘Constitutional contact with the disparities in the
world: Poverty as a prohibited ground of discrimination under the Canadian Charter
and human rights law’ (1994) 2 Review of Constitutional Studies 76 at 95–100; Stiglitz
op cit note 32 at 118–45; Martin Gilens & Benjamin I Page ‘Testing theories of
American politics: Elites, interest groups and average citizens’ (2014) 12 Perspectives on
Politics 564.
38 See Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (6) SA416
(CC) para 115. For a critical analysis of the courts’ jurisprudence on participation in
legislative processes and its ability to overcome the political marginalisation of the
poor, see Henk Botha ‘Representing the poor: Law, poverty and democracy’ (2011)
22 Stellenbosch LR 521.
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poor people meaningful access to the political processes which determine the
budgetary priorities and programmes for delivering socio-economic rights.
However, as Sen and others argue, acknowledging the close interrelation
between inequality and poverty does not imply that poverty can or should be
reduced to a metric of inequality.39 This would imply that poverty is reduced
as greater equality is achieved in a society, even though large swathes of the
population may not enjoy a minimally adequate standard of living. Con-
versely, it would imply that great strides in improving living standards overall
would not count as a poverty reduction achievement without an equivalent
reduction in social inequalities. As David Bilchitz has emphasised, in order to
be meaningful, socio-economic rights must be accorded an independent
substantive content which is not reducible to the relative beneﬁts enjoyed by
others.40
Providing access to a basic set of social safety nets through public provision
of a range of social goods and services of a decent quality can help to alleviate
the worst ravages of poverty. However, the argument that I have sought to
advance in this part of the article is that measures designed to achieve the
fulﬁlment of socio-economic rights must take into account the broader
patterns of inequality in society. Steep inequalities in income and resources
not only enable the rich to accumulate greater economic and political power,
but also undermine the ability of people to participate as equals in all spheres
of society. The result is a vicious spiral generating entrenched structural
patterns of poverty and inequality. While the content of socio-economic
rights cannot be developed solely by reference to the ideals and values
associated with equality, the empirical evidence demonstrates that the two
are intertwined and the goals associated with each will not be achieved
without paying attention to the other.
The time has now come to explore the dimensions of equality most salient
in advancing a just distribution of socio-economic resources, and how they
should inform the design of just institutional arrangements for a democratic
society.
III DISTRIBUTIVE EQUALITY WITHIN THE EGALITARIAN
LIBERAL TRADITION
A number of philosophers within the broad egalitarian liberal tradition have
grappled with the question of the appropriate metric of equalisation
(‘equality of what?’), and the principles which should govern a just distribu-
tion of resources. In this part, I consider three internationally inﬂuential
approaches to these questions — those of Ronald Dworkin, Amartya Sen
and John Rawls — and evaluate the suitability of the respective theories for
the adjudication of the socio-economic rights in the SouthAfrican Constitu-
tion. I conclude by noting the synergies between Rawls’s concept of a ‘social
39 Sen (1983) op cit note 34 at 156–7.
40 Bilchitz op cit note 17 at 166–70.
INTERPRETATION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 419
JOBNAME: SALJ 15 Part2 PAGE: 10 SESS: 16 OUTPUT: Thu Apr 30 17:13:52 2015
/first/juta/juta/SALJ−2015−Part2/05article
minimum’ and the concept of ‘parity of participation’ developed by the
critical political theorist, Nancy Fraser. I argue that the latter concept is the
most promising in developing an equality-promoting interpretation of
socio-economic rights in the SouthAfrican context.
(a) Ronald Dworkin
Ronald Dworkin regards a commitment to egalitarianism, understood as an
obligation of government to treat each citizen with equal concern, as a
precondition of political legitimacy:
‘Equal concern is the sovereign virtue of political community — without it
government is only tyranny — and when a nation’s wealth is very unequally
distributed, as the wealth of even very prosperous nations now is, then its equal
concern is suspect.’41
For Dworkin the appropriate metric for distributive equality is equality of
resources. These are broadly resources such as property, income and the
rights which people enjoy under the prevailing legal system to utilise this
property.42 But what does it mean to treat people with equal concern in the
context of the distribution of resources? According to Dworkin, this requires
the complex reconciliation of two primary ethical principles. The ﬁrst is the
principle that government should be concerned that the lives of people go
well, and that it is equally important that each person’s life goes well. The
second is the principle of individual responsibility — that we each have a
special, personal responsibility to decide what kind of life is best suited to us,
and to decide how best to use our resources to achieve our life goals. Public
policy in the sphere of distributive justice must respect both the principle of
equal importance of people’s lives and be sensitive to personal responsibility
and choice.43
The mechanism that he argues would best give effect to these principles is
based on a scenario of a distribution of resources determined according to a
hypothetical auction where people bargain with an equal stock of counters
(equal economic baseline) for a share of available community resources.44
However, it is evident that after the auction, the state where everyone enjoys
an equal share of community resources will not endure for long. The
resources which people accumulate or lose over time will be affected
fundamentally by their choices as well as contingencies over which they may
have no control, such as living with a disability or a particular talent and skills
set (‘brute luck’, in Dworkin’s terminology).According to Dworkin, the way
that brute luck in life is distributed is essentially arbitrary and should not be
allowed to undermine equality of resources. However, resource distributions
41 Ronald Dworkin Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (2000) 1.
See alsoRonald Dworkin Justice for Hedgehogs (2011) ch 16.
42 Dworkin (2000) ibid at 65 and 321.
43 Ibid at 324.
44 For a full description of this hypothetical auction, and the considerations under-
lying it, see ibid at 67–71.
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should be sensitive to people’s choices to live in a certain way, for example, to
value hard work and saving over a more relaxed and consumerist lifestyle).45
The redistributive model he develops to compensate for brute luck is based
on a hypothetical insurance market.46 The premiums paid toward such
insurance are estimated and collected as a tax which can be used to
compensate people who are disadvantaged by brute luck.47 Dworkin
provides practical examples of how such a hypothetical insurance scheme
could serve as a model for a new public health care scheme as well as
unemployment insurance and other welfare policies in the US context.48
The notion that the distribution of social and economic resources must
show respect for the principle of equal concern requires responsiveness to
individual circumstances and needs. Some, owing to their vulnerability and
special needs, may require more resources to compensate for ‘brute luck’ in
personal endowments and circumstances. The principle of equal concern is
reﬂected in the context-sensitive nature of the test for unfair discrimination
developed by the Constitutional Court which eschews an equal treatment
model in favour of one that is sensitive to the disparate impact of the
measures complained of on groups in their particular social and historical
context.49 The principle of equal concern also ﬁnds expression within the
reasonableness model of review in the context of socio-economic rights. As
Yacoob J held in Grootboom:
‘To be reasonable, measures cannot leave out of account the degree and extent
of the denial of the right they endeavour to realise. . . . [T]he Constitution
requires that everyone must be treated with care and concern. If the measures,
though statistically successful, fail to respond to the needs of those most
desperate, they may not pass the test.’50
However, the central distinction drawn by Dworkin between choices for
which an individual must bear personal responsibility, and those that are
beyond her control (for which she must be compensated) can be criticised.As
David Bilchitz observes, the capacity to choose and the range of choices in
fact available to an individual are also in some senses the consequence of
brute luck. The are largely dependent on the social, economic and cultural
environment into which they were born. Thus, ‘attempting to distinguish
between chosen and unchosen features of the self seems to be like attempting
to divide what is fundamentally intertwined’.51 The empirical evidence
45 Ibid at 323
46 Ibid at 73–99.
47 Ibid at 99–109. See also Dworkin (2011) op cit note 41 at 360–1.
48 Dworkin (2000) op cit note 41 at chs 8 and 9.
49 See for example, President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1
(CC) para 41.
50 Grootboom supra note 11 para 44.
51 David Bilchitz ‘Egalitarian liberalism, distributive justice and the new constitu-
tionalism’ (2014) 140 Theoria 47. For a similar criticism, see Sen (2010) op cit note 34
at 266–7.
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discussed above supports this critique by demonstrating how the circum-
stance of being born into a society with high levels of inequality negatively
affects social mobility, restricting the nature and range of choices available to
succeeding generations.52
Moreover, the impact of South Africa’s colonial and apartheid history
makes it an impossible task to disentangle inequalities of resources resulting
from people’s ostensibly free choices and those generated by a history of
systemic discrimination and dispossession. For this reason, requiring state
policy to display equal concern for an individual’s unique circumstances and
needs would seem to be the more contextually appropriate application of
Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources for South Africa’s socio-economic
rights jurisprudence.
(b) Amartya Sen
For Sen, the capabilities which people have to lead the kind of life they have
reason to value is the appropriate focus for distributive justice.53 Sen’s major
concern is to focus attention on the actual substantive freedoms that people
are able to enjoy, rather than simply on the index of resources or even
Rawlsian ‘primary goods’ which can be accessed. Focusing simply on the
resources which people have does not take into consideration the range of
factors that can impact on people’s abilities to convert these resources into
effective combinations of human functionings. These factors range from
personal characteristics, the impact of physical and social environments, and
(as already noted) inequality.As Sen notes,
‘[t]he variations in conversion opportunities are not just matters of what can be
seen as ‘‘special needs’’, but reﬂect pervasive variations — large, small and
medium — in the human condition and in relevant social circumstances’.54
However, Sen does not contend that the central goal of justice should be the
equalising of capabilities.55 He reasons that equality of capability is only one
dimension or space of equality, and demanding capability equality may
conﬂict with other weighty considerations of procedural justice or even
equality in other spheres. He gives the example of the well-established fact
that given symmetric care, women tend to live longer than men, with lower
mortality rates in each age group. However, an exclusive focus on equalising
men’s capability to live as long as women ‘would ﬂagrantly violate a
signiﬁcant requirement of process equity (in particular, treating different
people similarly in matters of life and death)’.56
52 Wilkinson& Pickett op cit note 31 at ch 12.
53 Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 74–5; Sen (2010) op cit note 34 at 231–5.
54 Sen (2010) ibid at 261.
55 Ibid at 295.
56 Ibid at 269.
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Sen cautions against a ‘unifocal view of equality’ and calls attention to the
multiple dimensions in which equality matters.57 He observes that other
considerations — in addition to capabilities — may be relevant to distribu-
tional judgments such as the appropriate weight to be accorded to rewarding
personal efforts and labour and advancing aggregate welfare.58 Moreover, a
focus on capability equality would not yield deﬁnitive judgments in all cases,
given the reasonable variations in the choice of relative weights to be
attached to different types of capabilities giving rise to partial orderings.
In the context of development policy and the realisation of socio-
economic rights,59 a focus on capabilities highlights how unequal social
structures can undermine people’s abilities to convert access to resources and
services into valuable functionings even where absolute poverty has been
eliminated. Unlike Dworkin and Rawls, whose projects are to specify the
principles for designing and evaluating just institutions and distributions,
Sen’s focus on capabilities is intended rather to function as a sphere for
comparative judgments and public reasoning regarding the social arrange-
ments which best advance human capability freedom.60 For this reason, Sen
has resisted attempts to specify a central list of capabilities which must be
guaranteed as fundamental human rights.61
The capabilities approach can provide a basis for evaluating how the
absence of social programmes or inadequate social provision lead to dispari-
ties in what various groups in society are able to be or to do. However, Sen
provides little guidance regarding what capabilities should be subject to an
equalising imperative.62 It may be that over time, greater clarity and
consensus would emerge through public deliberation on the nature of the
capabilities which should be subject to equalisation in the South African
context. In these circumstances, it is conceivable that a broader scope would
exist for integrating capability inequality as a factor in assessing the reason-
ableness of the state’s social programmes.
(c) John Rawls
John Rawls sought to develop principles to designate the basic features of a
just society,63 which could form the basis of an ‘overlapping consensus’
57 Ibid at 297.
58 Ibid at 297.
59 Ibid at 381. For Sen’s rebuttal of the institutional and feasibility critiques of social
and economic rights, see ibid at 382–5.
60 Ibid at 232–3 and 241–3; Sen (1999) op cit note 53 at 30–4.
61 Compare for example, Martha Nussbaum Women and Human Development
(2000) 96–101. For Sen’s response, see Amartya Sen ‘Elements of a theory of human
rights’ (2004) 32 Philisophy & Public Affairs 315.
62 For a critique of the lack of a theory of value in Sen’s capabilities theory, see
Bilchitz op cit note 17 at 10–12.
63 John Rawls A Theory of Justice (1999). This work was originally published in
1971 and revised in 1999.All references herein are to the revised edition.
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between members of diverse democratic societies.64 Rawls’s principles of
justice apply to a set of ‘primary goods’ conceived as those goods citizens
need to function as free and equal persons in society. These comprise basic
rights and liberties, opportunities to occupy ofﬁces and positions of responsi-
bilities in political and economic institutions, income and wealth, and the
social bases of self-respect.65 According to Rawls, the distribution of primary
goods in society must reﬂect fair terms of social co-operation between free
and equal citizens. They do so when they conform to two principles of
justice.66 These two principles are intended to inform the design of the basic
structure and political and economic institutions of a democratic society.67
The ﬁrst principle, which enjoys lexical priority in relation to the second
principle, holds that ‘[e]ach person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully
adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with
the same scheme of liberties for all’.68 This basic scheme of civil and political
liberties is a ‘constitutional essential’ for Rawls.
The second principle of justice concerns the basis for distributing income
and wealth in a just society. It regards social and economic inequalities as
justiﬁable only when they satisfy the following two conditions: ‘First, they
are to be attached to ofﬁces and positions open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity; and second, they are to the greatest beneﬁt of the
least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle).’69
Fair equality of opportunity is a prior commitment to the difference
principle.70 A just society is not one that simply guarantees formal equality of
opportunity leading to a meritocratic society.71 This implies, according to
Rawls, that a free market system must be regulated by political and legal
institutions so as to prevent ‘excessive concentrations of property and wealth,
especially those likely to lead to political domination’.72 It also implies ‘equal
opportunities of education for all regardless of family income’.73 The second
part of the second principle holds that the economic and political system
must be structured in such a way that those who are poorer derive greater
beneﬁt from the system than they would under a more strictly equal
64 See John Rawls Political Liberalism (2005). This work was originally published in
1993.All references herein are to the expanded edition published in 2005.
65 Rawls ibid at 180–1.
66 Rawls argued that these are principles that would be chosen by participants in a
hypothetical social contract behind a veil of ignorance — the so-called ‘original
position’. SeeRawls (1999) op cit note 63 at ch 3.
67 On the ‘basic structure’of society, seeRawls (2001) op cit note 36 at 10–12.
68 Rawls (2001) ibid at 42. For the original formulation of this principle see Rawls
(1999) op cit note 63 at 52–4.
69 Rawls (2001) ibid at 42–3. For the original formulation of the second principle,
seeRawls (1999) ibid at 72.
70 Rawls (2001) ibid at 43.
71 Rawls (1999) op cit note 63 at 91; Rawls (2001) ibid at 43–4.
72 Rawls (2001) ibid at 44.
73 Ibid.
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system.74 Rawls contends we are led to the difference principle ‘if we wish to
set up the social system so that no one gains or loses from his arbitrary place in
the distribution of natural assets or his initial position in society without
giving or receiving compensating advantages in return’.75 The idea behind
the difference principle ‘is to redress the bias of contingencies in the direction
of equality’,76 and expresses a concept of reciprocity in which the distribu-
tion of talents is seen as a common asset to be put to work for the beneﬁt of
society as a whole, particularly the most disadvantaged.77
However, the principle of fair equality of opportunity and the difference
principle do not constitute ‘constitutional essentials’ for Rawls.78 His reasons
derive from the difﬁculty of making legitimate — in the sense of predictable
and transparent — judgments regarding compliance with the equalising
commitments of the second principle.79 As Frank Michelman observes, this
creates a gap in liberal theory between the demands of justice and the criteria
for assessing the legitimacy of a political order.80 The ostensible lack of
transparent standards for assessing compliance lies at the heart of the general
resistance in liberal theory to recognising the justiciability of rights which
impact on the distribution of the social and economic resources of a political
community.
Leaving aside the question whether it is possible to derive legitimate
standards for adjudicating the more far-reaching egalitarian commitments of
Rawls’s principle of justice, it is signiﬁcant that, subsequent to the original
publication in 1971 of A Theory of Justice, Rawls came to recognise the
principle of a ‘social minimum’ as a constitutional essential which courts
‘should be reasonably competent to assess’.81 The social minimum should
ensure that the strains on people’s commitment are not excessive in the sense
that, while regarding themselves as free and equal citizens, they can no longer
afﬁrm the principles of justice as the public conception of justice for the basic
74 Rawls (1999) op cit note 63 at 56.
75 Ibid at 87.
76 Ibid at 86.
77 Ibid at 87–8. See also the linkages that Rawls draws between the difference
principle and the concept of fraternity ibid at 90–1.
78 Rawls (2005) op cit note 64 at 228–9.
79 In order to be legitimate, a political system which requires citizens to comply on
a regular basis with its laws must contain clear and predictable standards for judging
such compliance. On the incompatibility of the second principle of justice with the
standard of constitutional legitimacy, see Rawls (2001) op cit note 36 at 48–50; Rawls
(2005) ibid at 227–30.
80 See Frank Michelman ‘Poverty in liberalism: A comment on the constitutional
essentials’ (2012) 60 Drake LR 1001 at 1014–17; Frank IMichelman ‘Constitutionally
binding social and economic rights as a compelling idea: Reciprocating perturbations
in liberal and democratic constitutional visions’ in HelenaAliviar García, Karl Klare &
LucyAWilliams (eds) Social and Economic Rights in Theory and Practice: Critical Inquiries
(2015) 277.
81 Rawls (2001) op cit note 36 at 162, citing Michelman op cit note 24 and
Michelman ‘Welfare rights in a constitutional democracy’ (1979) Washington Univ
Law Quarterly 659. See alsoRawls (2005) op cit note 64 at 7 and 166.
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structure of society.82 This occurs, in the ﬁrst instance, when people become
resentful and are led to take violent action to protest against their social
conditions. But even in a milder sense, the strains of commitment should not
be such that people become cynical, alienated and withdrawn from political
society.83 The meeting of people’s basic material needs that enable them to
lead decent lives may prevent strains on commitment in the ﬁrst sense.
However, Rawls argues that this may not be sufﬁcient to prevent political
alienation in the second sense. The latter ‘requires that the least advantaged
feel that they are a part of political society, and view the public culture with
its ideals and principles as of signiﬁcance to themselves’.84 Thus he argues that
the difference principle speciﬁes a social minimum based on bonds of
reciprocity between individuals and society.85 It encompasses a social safety
net to meet the basic needs essential for a ‘decent life’. However, in a
property-owing democracy it should also be extensive enough so that people
feel that they have a meaningful stake in the political and economic life of the
nation thus preventing alienation in both senses described above.86 Thus the
content of the social minimum must be informed by inquiring ‘what is
required to give due weight to the idea of society as a fair system of
co-operation between free and equal citizens, and not to regard it, in practice
if not in speech, as so much rhetoric’.87
A comprehensive evaluation of Rawls’s theory of justice is beyond the
scope of this article, except to note that certain aspects of his theory are not
consonant with the ethos and structure of the South African Bill of Rights.
This is particularly the case with regard to the separation of political and
economic principles within the structure of Rawls’s theory of justice, and
according lexical priority to civil and political liberties over the principles
governing the distribution of material resources. In Grootboom, the Constitu-
tional Court emphasised that all the rights in the Bill of Rights ‘are
inter-related and mutually supporting’.88 The speciﬁc concept of the social
minimum would appear to be the most useful in developing equality as a
value in the interpretation of socio-economic rights. It could serve not as a
minimum core concept forming an independent cause of action (which the
court has repeatedly rejected), but as a factor in the overall reasonableness
82 Rawls (2001) ibid at 128.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid at 129.
85 Rawls views non-fulﬁlment of the social minimum as an obvious indicator that
the difference principle is being blatantly violated. Ibid at 162.
86 Ibid at 130. See also ibid at 132.
87 Rawls (2005) op cit note 64 at 166. He also notes (ibid) that ‘below a certain
level of material and social well-being, and of training and education, people simply
cannot take part in society as citizens, much less equal citizens.’
88 Grootboom supra note 11 para 23. For an analysis of the broader difﬁculty of
seeking to apply moral principles derived deductively from a hypothetical choice
situation to the adjudication of constitutional rights in a democracy, see Goodwin Liu
‘Rethinking constitutional welfare rights’ (2008) 61 Stanford LR 203 at 224–7.
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inquiry.89 However, in order to ﬂesh out the potential of the material
preconditions for equal citizenship implicit in the Rawlsian social minimum,
I conclude this part by considering the principle of ‘participatory parity’ in
the work of the critical theorist, Nancy Fraser.
(d) From social minimum to participatory parity
The concept of ‘parity of participation’ in political, economic and social
spheres lies at the heart of the Nancy Fraser’s conception of justice.90 It is thus
worthwhile to examine how this concept elaborates on the interconnection
between social provisioning and equal citizenship suggested by Rawls’s social
minimum. Fraser argues that the principle, central to the liberal tradition of
the equal moral worth of citizens, requires ‘parity of participation’ across
multiple discursive arenas in society where political, economic and social
decision-making occurs.91
The standard of participatory parity is thus more demanding than formal
equality as it requires the creation of the necessary substantive conditions for
people to participate in society as peers or equals. Fraser identiﬁes at least two
conditions that must be satisﬁed for participatory parity to be satisﬁed. The
ﬁrst, the objective condition of participatory parity, concerns the economic
and social arrangements of a society. It would preclude, in Fraser’s words,
‘social arrangements that institutionalize deprivation, exploitation, and gross
disparities in wealth, income, and leisure time, thereby denying some people
the means and opportunities to interact with others as peers’.92
A necessary condition for parity of participation is thus the elimination of
systemic economic inequalities. This does not mean, according to Fraser,
‘that everyone must have exactly the same income, but it does require the
sort of rough equality that is inconsistent with systemically generated
relations of dominance and subordination’.93 In Rawlsian terms, such
relations would strain the bonds of people’s social commitment and under-
mine social co-operation based on free and equal individuals.
The second condition of participatory parity concerns the intersubjective
conditions for social relations, entailing cultural patterns of value that
89 On the window left open by the court for some notion of minimum standards to
play a role in the reasonableness assessment, see Grootboom supra note 11 para 33;
Treatment Action Campaign supra note 12 para 34.
90 See Nancy Fraser ‘Rethinking the public sphere: A contribution to the critique
of actually existing democracy’ in C Calhoud (ed) Habermas and the Public Sphere
(1992) 109–42; Nancy Fraser ‘Rethinking recognition’ (2000) 3 New Left Review
107–20; Nancy Fraser ‘Social justice in the age of identity politics: Redistribution,
recognition, and participation’ in N Fraser &AHonneth (eds) Redistribution or Recog-
nition: A Political-Philosophical Exchange (2003) 7.
91 In contrast to Habermas, Fraser argues for a plurality of public deliberative
arenas instead of a single overarching public sphere. See Fraser (1992) ibid at 121–8.
On the linkage between parity of participation and the equal moral worth attributed
to human beings, see Fraser (2003) ibid at 229–33.
92 Fraser (2003) ibid at 36.
93 Fraser (1992) op cit note 90 at 121.
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systematically ‘deny some people the status of full partners in interaction —
whether by burdening them with excessive ascribed ‘‘difference’’or by failing
to acknowledge their distinctiveness’.94 The ﬁrst-mentioned barrier to
participatory parity is associated with the politics of redistribution, whilst the
latter is associated with the politics of recognition involving the struggle to
afﬁrm the identities and equal status of groups on the basis of their race,
gender, sexual orientation and similar grounds. Fraser proceeds to develop a
sophisticated account of how the two barriers to participatory parity
interrelate in particular contexts so as to reinforce the disadvantages associ-
ated with each, and the complex strategies required to pursue transformative
social change.95 The history of the interrelationship between racial and class
discrimination in SouthAfrica illustrates the complexities of this interaction.
Fraser’s account of democratic justice based on the right of all to
participate as equals in society resonates with many features of South African
constitutionalism. It is based on a substantive account of equal participation
which is sensitive to both the economic and socio-cultural barriers to
effective participation. This resonates with the South African jurisprudence
and scholarship on the plural dimensions of substantive equality.96 Secondly,
participatory parity is premised on a deep concept of participatory democracy
which recognises that decisions impacting on people’s rights and well-being
are not conﬁned to formal electoral politics and political institutions. Such
decisions extend across society, including institutions and organisations
located within the broader economy and labour market. For example, the
institutions and normative frameworks of labour, consumer and contract law
play a signiﬁcant role in shaping the extent to which people can participate as
peers in the economy and gain effective access to resources and services. This
is consonant with the endorsement of participatory democracy by the
Constitutional Court as an important dimension of South Africa’s constitu-
tional democracy, complementing representative democracy.97 It also
accords with the application of the Bill of Rights to both the public and
private spheres as indicated by ss 8(2) and (3) as well as s 39(2) of the
Constitution.98
A potential drawback which participatory parity shares with other theories
of democratic justice is its circularity. It requires parity of participation for
94 Fraser (2003) op cit note 90 at 36.
95 Ibid.
96 For accounts of the application of complex equality in the SouthAfrican context
incorporating recognition, redistribution and democratic participation, see H Botha
‘Equality, plurality and structural power’ (2009) 25 SAJHR 1; S Fredman ‘Redistri-
bution and recognition: Reconciling inequalities’ (2007) 23 SAJHR 214.
97 On the signiﬁcance of participatory democracy to SouthAfrican constitutional-
ism, see Schubart Park Resident’s Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality
2013 (1) SA323 (CC) paras 43–8 and the jurisprudence cited in footnotes 30–5.
98 On the application of socio-economic rights in South Africa to private law, see
S Liebenberg ‘Socio-economic rights beyond the public-private law divide’ in
MLangford, BCousins, J Dugard &TMadlingozi (eds) op cit note 10 at 63.
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decision-making which impacts on people’s rights, but in order for there to
be parity participants must be accorded the rights that secure them the
material and socio-cultural preconditions for fair participation. However,
Fraser argues that this circularity is not vicious. The circle is broken through
practical strategies to transform the social conditions that constitute a barrier
to participatory parity.99 Participatory parity entails making both ﬁrst order
claims for recognition and redistribution as well as ‘second-order or meta-
level claims about the conditions in which ﬁrst-order claims are adjudicat-
ed’.100 The advantage of raising meta-level claims is that it enables a critique
of existing institutional processes of deliberation which fail to live up to the
ideal of participatory parity. It would thus provide a frame for evaluating to
what extent political, economic and legal institutions in South Africa enable
economically marginalised groups to participate as peers or equals and, where
required, could support calls for structural reforms of the relevant institu-
tions.
In part IV below I consider how the signiﬁcant concepts in egalitarian
liberal theory discussed in this part could be applied in practice to South
Africa’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence. Particular attention will be
paid to the principle of participatory parity as the optimal method of
integrating the value of equality in South Africa’s socio-economic rights
jurisprudence.
IV INTEGRATING EQUALITY IN SOUTH AFRICA’S SOCIO-
ECONOMIC RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE
(a) Introduction
The structure and normative foundations of market economies enable the
wealthy to enjoy a superior quality of the goods and services associated with
socio-economic rights. The ideological hold of this form of economic
organisation in contemporary democracies such as South Africa, coupled
with the institutional constraints associated with the adjudication of socio-
economic rights, imposes distinct limits on what can be achieved in seeking
to advance a broader project of egalitarianism through litigation. Neverthe-
less, I contend that courts can play a modest, but not insigniﬁcant role in
nudging social policy and economic relationships in the direction of a more
egalitarian distribution of valued social resources and services. It is this role I
explore in this part.
I turn now to consider how the principles and concepts developed by
egalitarian liberal theorists could be applied in practice to two aspects of
SouthAfrica’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence — reviewing the reason-
ableness of state social programmes and applying socio-economic rights to
contractual relations. I focus primarily on the principle of participatory parity,
given its synergies with many aspects of South African constitutionalism.
99 Fraser (2003) op cit note 90 at 42–5.
100 Ibid at 44.
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Furthermore, it directs our attention to the kinds of social relationships
which the distribution of material resources should seek to foster in a
constitutional democracy based on the equal citizenship of all.
(b) Incorporating participatory parity in reasonableness review
The ﬁrst area I consider is how the courts could draw on the concept of
participatory parity to nudge the state to improve the quantity and quality of
social services delivered to impoverished communities. Through improving
both the scope and quality of social programmes, the state will simulta-
neously achieve the dual objectives of responding to the basic material needs
of impoverished communities and reducing the vast disparities in the
enjoyment of socio-economic rights existing between the rich and the poor
in SouthAfrica.
In the leading judgment of the Constitutional Court on the sufﬁciency of
basic services being delivered to the poor, Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg,101
O’Regan J commences her judgment by observing that ‘the achievement of
equality, one of the founding values of our Constitution, will not be
accomplished while water is abundantly available to the wealthy, but not to
the poor’.102 However, the judgment has been criticised (amongst other
reasons)103 for an insufﬁcient consideration of the impacts on the impover-
ished Phiri community of the water programme instituted by the City of
Johannesburg, Operation Gcin’amanzi (to save water). The programme
limited the amount of free basic water to 6 kilolitres per household104 and
required the installation of pre-paid water meters as a condition for residents
receiving a water supply in their homes.105 The latter resulted in the
automatic termination of a household’s water supply unless additional water
credits were purchased.
Much weight is attached in the Constitutional Court’s judgment to the
constraints faced by the local authority in achieving the pragmatic manage-
ment of water resources for the beneﬁt of the Johannesburg community as a
101 Supra note 12.
102 Ibid para 2.
103 See Liebenberg op cit note 10 at 466–80; Geo Quinot ‘Substantive reasoning in
administrative-law adjudication’ (2010) 3 Constitutional Court Review 111; Lucy A
Williams ‘The role of courts in the quantitative implementation of social and eco-
nomic rights: A comparative study’ (2010) 3 Constitutional Court Review 141; Paul
O’Connell ‘The death of socio-economic rights’ (2011) 74 Modern LR 532 at 550–2.
For a defence of the judgment, see Edwin Cameron Justice: A Personal Account (2014)
267–70.
104 The 6 kilolitres per household was calculated on the national prescribed mini-
mum basic water supply of 25 litres per person per day for a household of eight
persons: Regulations relating to compulsory national standards and measures to con-
serve water, GG 22355, reg 3 (published in terms of s 9 of the National Water
ServicesAct 108 of 1997).
105 The alternative was outdoor delivery of water through a yard standpipe. The
option of a credit system available to other households in Johannesburg, including
wealthier areas, was thus precluded.
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whole.106 While the latter are certainly valid considerations within the
overall reasonableness assessment, the court did not engage in a systematic
manner with the impact of the scheme on the ability of residents with very
low incomes and large households107 to sustain life without serious health
risks. This is despite the expert international evidence presented on the
greater quantity of water required for the latter purposes, as well as to cater
for the particular needs of a community in which a number of households are
headed by women and there is a high prevalence of people living with
HIV/AIDS.108 Furthermore, the evidence suggested that the cumulative
effect of Operation Gcin’amanzi was to create disparate burdens in accessing
water by the impoverished residents of Phiri compared to residents in the
wealthier, former white group areas of Johnnesburg. These burdens ranged
from the inequality created between larger and smaller households; the
procedural and planning advantages of having water delivered on the credit
water payment system available to wealthy Johannesburg as opposed to the
pre-paid water meter system;109 and the City’s Indigent Registration Policy
which was under-inclusive and experienced by residents as stigmatising.110
Applying some of the insights from the egalitarian theories discussed
above, it could be argued that the water scheme introduced by the City of
Johannesburg failed to display equal concern for the Phiri residents by not
taking into account how a limited free basic water supply combined with the
pre-paid water meter impacted particularly harshly on them, given their
social and economic realities. This included the prevalence of larger
households than the average on which the free basic supply was calculated,
106 See, for example, Mazibuko (CC) supra note 12 paras 84, 89, 101 122–24 and
154.
107 Household incomes amongst the Phiri applicants were approximately R1100
per month, with many relying on government grants: Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg
(Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions as amicus curiae) [2008] 4 All SA 471 (W)
(hearafter ‘Mazibuko (HC)’) para 5. The average size of households in Phiri was a
minimum of sixteen persons: Mazibuko HC para 169; The household of the ﬁrst
applicant, Mrs Mazibuko, consisted of three different households with a total of
twenty residents: Mazibuko (CC) ibid para 87.
108 See Mazibuko (HC) ibid paras 159, 168–79; City of Johannesburg v Mazibuko 2009
(3) SA592 (SCA) (hereafter ‘Mazibuko (SCA)’) paras 16–24.
109 The unfair discrimination challenge in respect of the pre-paid water meters was
rejected by the Constitutional Court on the basis that it was not necessarily disadvan-
tageous to the Phiri community given that they received compensatory advantages
such as cheaper tariffs, avoiding interest on outstanding accounts and not being listed
with a credit bureau as a defaulter: See Mazibuko (CC) supra note 12 paras 148–58.
However, it is arguable that the economic burdens on residents of the former white
areas of Johannesburg could easily be absorbed by wealthy households and that the
advantages of the credit system (such as notice and an opportunity for representations)
would have alleviated the poverty-related burdens on the poorer households of Phiri.
It would also help alleviate the health and life-threatening harms associated with the
cutting off of the water supply to households which could not afford to purchase
additional water credits.
110 Mazibuko (CC) supra note 12 paras 98–102.
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the depth of poverty in the community, and the high HIV/AIDS burden it
carried. Viewed through Sen’s capabilities lens, the court could also have
considered how the scheme as a whole impacted on the ability of the
community to develop a range of valuable capabilities such as the ability to
sustain life, health and human dignity (for example, by having enough water
to ensure personal hygiene and clean clothing).
But beyond these biological and psychological impacts, there is also the
question of how a lack of access to sufﬁcient water impacts on people’s
abilities to participate as equals in society. Rawls’s principle of the social
minimum would invite consideration of how unequal access to water
between rich and poor areas strained the bonds of commitment to society
experienced by impoverished residents of Phiri. These strains are likely to be
intense given the fact that the communities that bore the brunt of apartheid
injustice continue to bear the disproportionate burden of poverty and
inequality. Finally, Fraser’s principle of participatory parity would require
close attention to how the intersecting harms of economic marginalisation
and racial and gender disadvantage impeded parity of participation in society
for Phiri residents.
The South Gauteng High Court engaged in some depth in its judgment
with the evidence regarding the particular impacts of having insufﬁcient
water on impoverished black women in the community. As Tsoka J
observed, South Africa is a patriarchal society.111 The burden of domestic
chores and caring for the young, ill and elderly falls disproportionately on
impoverished black women. This burden is aggravated when public services
such as water provision are inadequate as it is the women who must walk
long distances to collect the water and attempt to meet the cleaning, cooking
and hygiene needs of the household with limited water. In his afﬁdavit, the
President of the SouthernAfrican HIV Clinicians Society, Desmond Martin,
described how these burdens are aggravated in a community with a high
HIV/AIDS prevalence such as Phiri:
‘In general terms in South Africa women carry a disproportionate HIV-related
burden. This is because women are more susceptible to HIV-infection, more
vulnerable to sexual pressure and they are often the primary care-givers to
PLWHA [people living with AIDS]. Five of the second applicants in this case
are women representing female-headed households. One of these women,
Grace Munyai, was a care-giver to her HIV-infected niece. As testiﬁed in Mrs
Munyai’s afﬁdavit, the additional water required to take care of her HIV-
infected niece, Sizile, necessitated a 3 km walk to fetch water as the free basic
amount was insufﬁcient to ensure hygienic conditions and adequate drinking
water. Given the gendered nature of the HIV-pandemic it is particularly
important for women’s health, standard of living, equality and dignity to have
access to sufﬁcient water.’112
111 Mazibuko (HC) supra note 107 para 159.
112 Cited in Mazibuko (HC) ibid para 173.
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These circumstances would create multiple barriers to women like Mrs
Munyai being able to participate in political, economic and social activities at
all, let alone as an equal with more privileged citizens. Being unable to access
sufﬁcient water as a consequence of being poor clearly served to deepen the
multiple layers of exclusion and disadvantage experienced by women living
in Phiri.
In arriving at an overall assessment of the reasonableness of Operation
Gcin’amanzi, these lived realities of Phiri residents, and their implications for
the foundational constitutional value of equality, should have received more
sustained consideration. As I have noted above, such an assessment would
also require weighing the capacity and other constraints faced by local
government in achieving a fair and sustainable system of water distribution
within its jurisdiction. However, if reasonableness review is intended to be a
weighing of all factors relevant to the realisation of social rights, then a
context-sensitive evaluation of the impacts of social programmes on affected
parties, including on their ability to participate as equals in society, should
feature prominently in the overall assessment by courts of the reasonableness
of the relevant programmes.113 Including parity of participation as a factor in
the reasonableness inquiry would serve the further purpose of requiring
organs of state to consider how social programmes can be designed not only
to meet basic survival needs, but also to foster the ability of people to
participate as equals in society.
In Part IV(c) I consider how parity of participation could inform the
application of socio-economic rights to contractual relationships.
(c) Participatory parity in assessing contractual fairness
Even with generous social programmes in place, the rules governing
property and contract will remain signiﬁcant mechanisms for distributing
many valued social goods and services in market economies such as South
Africa. The legal rules of private law play a crucial role in structuring and
regulating exchanges of the goods and services which are the subject of
socio-economic rights. However, disparities in bargaining power between
economically more powerful and the economically weaker parties generate
profound inequalities in access to these goods and services in quantitative and
qualitative terms. The legal system can either reduce these inequalities in
bargaining power (through, for example, protective rules in favour of the
weaker party) or perpetuate unequal outcomes. Unless equalising measures
are put in place, doctrines that appear neutral in their operation (such as pacta
sunt servanda), enable more powerful parties to economic transactions to
113 It is beyond the scope of this article to consider how the different factors in the
reasonableness inquiry should be weighed.My primary objective here is to argue for a
more systematic consideration of the impacts of social programmes on their beneﬁ-
ciaries, including how they either foster or impede their ability to participate as equals
in society.
INTERPRETATION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 433
JOBNAME: SALJ 15 Part2 PAGE: 24 SESS: 16 OUTPUT: Thu Apr 30 17:13:52 2015
/first/juta/juta/SALJ−2015−Part2/05article
control access to socio-economic goods and services on terms favourable to
themselves.
The Constitutional Court has afﬁrmed that doctrines such as good faith
and public policy in contractual relations must be developed and applied with
reference to the normative value system created by the Constitution,
particularly human dignity, equality, freedom and ubuntu.114 It is an object of
our Constitution that ‘contracting parties are treated with equal worth and
concern’.115 The relative position of the contracting parties is, for example, a
relevant factor in assessing whether the operation of a contractual term is
contrary to public policy and should therefore not be enforced. As Ngcobo J
(as he then was) observed in Barkhuizen, this principle is important ‘in a
society as unequal as ours’116 in which many people conclude contracts
‘without any bargaining power and without understanding what they are
agreeing to’.117 This focus on unequal bargaining power in contractual
relations provides an important conduit for the value of equality to be
incorporated in contract law, particularly where the relevant contract impacts
on constitutionally protected socio-economic rights. Correcting for dispari-
ties in bargaining power is one way in which Fraser’s principle of parity of
participation can be applied to promote equality for economically weaker
parties in contractual relationships.
The Constitutional Court has provided protection against bargaining
disparities in contexts which affect people’s access to socio-economic rights
in various ways. Thus, for example, in Gundwana v Steko Development CC,118
the Constitutional Court held that when ordering default judgment, it is
unconstitutional for a registrar of a high court to declare immovable property
specially executable to the extent that this permits the sale in execution of a
person’s home. A court order with judicial oversight is required. In
elaborating on the nature of the judicial oversight to be exercised in these
circumstances, Froneman J held as follows:
‘[C]onstitutional considerations not in existence earlier . . . caution courts that
in allowing execution against immovable property due regard should be taken
of the impact that this may have on judgment debtors who are poor and at risk
of losing their homes. If the judgment debt can be satisﬁed in a reasonable
manner without involving those drastic consequences that alternative course
should be judicially considered before granting execution orders.’119
This introduces a proportionality assessment into the process for executing a
mortgage bond, thereby strengthening the protection of weaker parties
114 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) (hereafter ‘Barkhuizen’) paras 28–30;
Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC)
paras 71–2; Botha & another v Rich NO 2014 (4) SA124 (CC) para 46.
115 Botha v Rich NO ibid para 40.
116 Barkhuizen supra note 114 para 59.
117 Ibid para 65.
118 2011 (3) SA608 (CC).
119 Ibid para 53.
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when security of tenure in their homes is threatened.120 The Constitutional
Court rejected the argument upheld by the Supreme Court of Appeal in
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Saunderson121 that a mortgagor voluntarily
places her home at risk of execution when agreeing to the registration of a
mortgage bond over her property. This agreement does not imply that she
has waived her right of access to adequate housing, including the right not to
be evicted without a court order in terms of s 26(3). Nor does it imply an
acceptance of the mortgagee’s right to execution when it occurs in bad
faith.122 In essence, the agreement to register a mortgage bond as security for
ﬁnancing a home loan does not entail an agreement by the mortgagor to
forfeit her protection under s 26 of the Constitution. By insisting that the
values and interests underlying s 26 are relevant in legal proceedings to
execute a mortgage bond, the judgment helps create a more equitable legal
regime for the housing ﬁnance market. In this way, the court promotes
greater parity between ordinary people seeking to acquire ownership of a
home and the powerful banks upon which they depend for ﬁnance.
In the sphere of lease agreements, the Constitutional Court held in
Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties Ltd123 that a landlord’s conduct in
exercising the bare power of terminating leases for the sole purpose of
securing higher rentals was subject to scrutiny by the Gauteng Rental
Housing Tribunal as a potential ‘unfair practice’ in terms of the Rental
Housing Act 50 of 1999. The court held that one of the signiﬁcant ways in
which socio-economic rights such as housing can ‘ripple out’ to private
relationships is when the state takes legislative and other measures to fulﬁl the
relevant right. The Rental Housing Act was a prime instance of such a
measure.124 The Constitutional Court interpreted the Act in a way which
increases the protection of the housing rights of tenants who, in terms of the
pre-existing common law, were subject to the unrestrained power of the
landlord to terminate a lease of indeﬁnite duration on notice.125 Cameron J
held that the determination of whether an unfair practice in terms of the Act
has occurred requires that the common-law legal rights of a tenant or
landlord and their contractually agreed provisions must be subject ‘to
scrutiny for unfairness in the light of both parties’ rights and interests’.126
The court declined to express any view on the landlord’s common-law
entitlement to cancel the leases, nor on whether, if it was so entitled, ‘the
120 André van der Walt & Reghard Brits ‘Judicial oversight over the sale in execu-
tion of mortgaged property: Gundwana v Steko Development 2011 (3) SA 608 (CC);
Nedbank Ltd v Fraser and Four other cases 2011 (4) SA 363 (GSJ)’ (2012) 75 THRHR
322; L Steyn ‘ ‘‘Safe as houses?’’? — Balancing a mortgagee’s security interest with a
homeowner’s security of tenure’ (2007) 11 Law, Democracy and Development 101.
121 2006 (2) SA264 (SCA).
122 Gundwana v Steko Development supra note 118 paras 42–4.
123 2012 (3) SA531 (CC) (hereafter ‘Maphango’)
124 Ibid para 34.
125 Ibid para 29 and sources cited at footnote 21.
126 Ibid para 53.
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common law should be constitutionally developed to inhibit that power’.127
This may be justiﬁable under subsidiarity principles.128 On the other hand, it
may be viewed as a missed opportunity by the highest court to align the
background common-law rules of lease with the values and purposes of
s 26.129 Nevertheless, Maphango illustrates how the principles of fairness (in
this case statutorily derived) can help promote greater contractual parity
between economically disadvantaged tenants and lessors in the rental housing
market.
These cases represent two examples of how courts can facilitate greater
equality in contractual relations in the sphere of socio-economic rights.
Despite these positive precedents, coupled with the enactment of protective
legislation in a range of areas,130 the common-law tradition is likely to exert a
powerful restraining inﬂuence on both the development of the common law
and the interpretation of protective legislation.131 This tradition is strongly
inﬂuenced by classic liberal notions of individual autonomy and is generally
averse to interventions aimed at mitigating the harsh consequences of
contracts on the basis of unequal economic power. Sustained attention to the
impacts of economic inequality on the ability of people to participate as
equals in transactions which affect their access to socio-economic rights thus
remains a critical challenge.
V CONCLUSION
Inequality in the distribution of resources in society is a formidable obstacle
to the sustainable realisation of socio-economic rights. It produces patterns of
power and privilege that are incompatible with a deep commitment to the
equal worth of each person and prevents people from participating as equals
in the political, economic and social arenas where distributive decisions are
made. The Constitution and relevant jurisprudence supports an understand-
ing of equality and socio-economic rights as mutually constitutive.
This article considered what light major theorists within the egalitarian
liberal tradition can shed on the nature of this interrelationship. The potential
and drawbacks of Dworkin’s theory of displaying equal concern for persons
127 Ibid para 55. See also ibid para 4.
128 SeeAndré van derWalt Property and Constitution (2012) 57–60.
129 See Frank Michelman ‘Expropriation, eviction and the gravity of the common
law’ (2013) 2 Stellenbosch LR 245; Brian Ray ‘Eviction, aspiration and avoidance’
(2014) 5 Constitutional Court Review 173 at 200–10.
130 See for example, the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 and the Consumer Protec-
tionAct 68 of 2008.
131 Marius Pieterse ‘Indirect horizontal application of the right to have access to
health care services’ (2007) 23 SAJHR 157; Deeksha Bhana ‘The role of judicial
method in the relinquishing of constitutional rights through contracts’ (2008) 24
SAJHR 300; Dennis M Davis & Karl Klare ‘Transformative constitutionalism and the
common and customary law’ (2010) 26 SAJHR 403 at 468–81; Dennis M Davis
‘Developing the common law of contract in the light of poverty and illiteracy: The
challenge of the Constitution’ (2011) 22 Stellenbosch LR 845.
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in the distribution of resources, Sen’s capabilities theory, and Rawls’s two
principles of justice were weighed. I found that Rawls’s concept of the ‘social
minimum’ displays the most promise in drawing an important link between
people’s access to a decent level of social provisioning and their perception of
themselves as free and equal participants in society. I concluded by consider-
ing how Nancy Fraser’s concept of participatory parity extends the idea of
equal citizenship underlying the social minimum. I argued that participatory
parity provides an optimal frame for evaluating the intersecting impacts of
unequal resource distributions and hierarchies of status on grounds such as
race and gender.
The ﬁnal part examined how participatory parity could be applied in
practice to two major areas of South African socio-economic rights jurispru-
dence: the assessment of the reasonableness of government socio-economic
programmes and contractual relations affecting access to socio-economic
rights. In so doing, I sought to demonstrate how the value of equality —
understood as the ability of people to participate as equals in all spheres of
South African political and economic life — can enrich our socio-economic
rights jurisprudence and nudge social policy and legal doctrine in a more
egalitarian direction.
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